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Commentary

Eminent Domain: Judicial and
Legislative Responses to Keio
Alan C. Weinstein

It has been almost a year and a half
since the Supreme Court ruled in Keio
v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005), that the federal Constitution
does not bar government from using
eminent domain for economic develop
ment purposes. That ruling precipi
tated an unprecedented negative reac
tion in state legislatures. 1 Now, Ohio
has delivered the first post-Keio state
supreme court decision to address the
constitutionality of eminent domain.
On July 26, in City ofNorwood v.
Horney, 2006 WL 2096001, a unani
mous Ohio Supreme Court rejected
the arguments of the majority in Keio
and emphatically stated that the Ohio
constitution prohibits the use of emi
nent domain solely for the purpose of
providing an economic benefit to the
government and community. This
commentary discusses and analyzes
both the Norwood ruling and the vari
ous state and federal legislative
responses to Keio.
THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S
NORWOOD DECISION

The Norwood case presented facts that
should sound familiar to planners in
older urban areas. The city of Norwood
Alan C. Weinstein Is associate professor of Lew end Urban
Studies at Cleveland-Marshall College of Lew end holds a
joint faculty appointment In the Maxine Goodman Levin
College of Urban Affairs. He also serves as director of the
Colleges' JD/MPA end JD/MUPDO Joint Degree programs end
Law and Public Polley program.

is a "first-ring" Cincinnati suburb. As
with many such cities, it has seen its job
base erode due to the continuing
decline in manufacturing. It also saw the
fabric of many of its neighborhoods dis
rupted by the construction of federal
interstate highways from the early 1960s
through the early 1970s. With its tax
base shrinking, the city eliminated jobs
and cut services but still fell millions of
dollars in debt. In 2003, the city sup
ported a private developer's proposal to
redevelop a neighborhood that had been
in decline since the completion of
Interstate 71 in 1974. The project,
Rookwood Exchange, would add 200
new apartments and condominiums and
more than 500,000 square feet of com
mercial space, yielding nearly $2 million
·
in annual revenue to the city.
The developers, Anderson Real
Estate and Miller-Valentine Group,
requested that the city acquire the
properties by eminent domain, but
Norwood insisted that the developers
first negotiate with the owners. The
developers secured sales agreements
with a substantial majority of the own
ers, at which point the city agreed to
acquire 12 remaining properties whose
owners refused to sell.

As required by the city code,
Norwood commissioned a consulting
firm-paid for by the developer-to
conduct an urban renewal study prior
to initiating eminent domain proceed
ings. That study concluded that the
properties to be acquired were in a
"deteriorating area," which allowed the
city to proceed with its acquisition
effort. After the property owners' chal
lenge to the exercise of eminent
domain lost at trial, they appealed but
were unable to obtain an injunction
barring the city from acquiring their
properties pending the appeal because
Ohio statute ORC § 163.19 allows a city
to obtain and transfer titles to con
demned properties if it deposits with
the court the full amount of the com
pensation awards. Norwood did just
that and the developer began demol
ishing the houses in the neighborhood.
But when the owners' appeal reached
the Ohio Supreme Court, it ordered a
halt to any further demolitions pending
its ruling.
That ruling was announced in a
unanimous opinion that is easily the
most expansive and scholarly land use
decision handed down by the Ohio
court in recent decades. Obviously, the
1. See, e.g., Keio and Counting,
June 2006.
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. Shorn~ early media reports of the Norwood decision suggested
t at 1t ca 1led for heightened judicial scrutiny of any exercise
I of eminent domain. This is not so.

justices were well aware that theirs was
the first state supreme court decision in
the wake of Keio and would be closely
scrutinized. They likely were also
aware that experienced land use law
commentators would be looking for any
missteps, since this was the court
which had somehow managed to
announce a conjunctive "two-part tak
ings test" 2 at a time when the U.S.
Supreme Court's Agins decision called
for a disjunctive test. 3
The Norwood opinion addressed
both substantive and procedural con
cerns. First, as previously noted, the
court held that the Ohio constitution
prohibits the use of eminent domain
solely for the purpose of providing an
economic benefit to the government
and community. The court framed this
part of its· opinion in terms of "resolv
ing the inherent tension between the
individual's right to possess and pre
serve property and the state's compet
ing interests in taking it for the com
munal good." City of Norwood v. Horney,
2006 WL 2096001 at 10. The court's
analysis on this point began by affirm
ing that "Ohio has always considered
the right of property to be a fundamen
tal right." Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
Turning next to an examination of the
state's power of eminent domain, the
court, after documenting at length the
evolution of the "public use" concept
from its pre-Revolutionary origins to the
expansive interpretation given the term
in the 20th century, opined that the Ohio
Constitution does not support the broad
definition of public use announced by
the Keio majority. Accordingly, the opin
ion stressed that whether a particular
proposed use is a "public use" is a ques
tion of law to be resolved by the courts
and "the courts owe no deference to a
legislative finding that the proposed tak
ing will provide financial benefit to a
community." Id. at 22.

Some early media reports of the
Norwood decision suggested that it
called for heightened judicial scrutiny
of any exercise of eminent domain.
This is not so. The opinion does
explicitly call for heightened scrutiny
when a court reviews an eminent
domain statute or regulation under the
void-for-vagueness doctrine-an issue
raised here due to the lack of clear
guidance in the Norwood code's defini
tion of the term "deteriorating"-but
the court did not extend heightened
scrutiny beyond that issue. Rather, the
opinion emphasized that courts retain a
vital, albeit limited, role in reviewing
exercises of eminent domain and
should not simply defer to legislative
judgments. The opinion criticized the
lower courts in Ohio for their "misun
derstanding of the scope of review" by
engaging in an "artificial judicial defer
ence to the state's determination that
there was sufficient public use." Id. at
16. In the court's view, the correct role
for the judiciary, while limited, remains
vital: " ... it is for the courts to ensure
that the legislature's exercise of power
is not beyond the scope of its authority,
and that the power is not abused by
irregular or oppressive use, or use in
bad faith." Id. at 19.
Having "clarified" the courts'
"proper role as arbiters of the scope of
eminent domain," the opinion consid
ered whether economic gain alone is a
sufficient public use to support an
exercise of eminent domain. Citing
with approval the analyses of the dis
senters in both the United States
Supreme Court and Connecticut
Supreme Court Keio opinions, and the
Michigan Supreme Court's opinion in
Wayne County v. Hathcock, 4 the Ohio
court ruled that while "economic bene
fit can be considered as a factor among
others in determining whether there is
a sufficient public use and benefit in a

taking, it cannot serve as the sole basis
for finding such a benefit." City of
Norwood v. Horney, 2006 WL 2096001
at 22.
In so holding, the Ohio court made
no effort to address Justice John Paul
Stevens's carefully argued majority
opinion in Keio, which stressed the fac
tors a court must examine to determine
whether the use of eminent domain for
economic development alone is truly
serving a legitimate public purpose
rather than improperly promoting a
purely private benefit. Had the Ohio
court approved those factors, emphasiz
ing public participation and compre
hensive planning, and then applied
them to the facts in this ·case without
"artificial judicial deference," it could
easily have called into question and
struck down this particular exercise of
eminent domain solely for economic
development without adopting a rule
prohibiting all such uses of the con
demnation power.
·
As previously noted, the court also
held that heightened scrutiny should
be applied to definitions in eminent
domain statutes and ordinances.
Having already determined that an
individual's property interest is a fun
damental right under the Ohio
Constitution, the court held that in
reviewing an eminent domain statute
or regulation under the void-for-vague
ness doctrine, courts should "utilize the
heightened standard of review
employed for a statute or regulation
that implicates a First Amendment or
other fundamental constitutional right.
Id. at 24. In Norwood, the challenged
definition was for a "deteriorating
area," which was the basis for finding
the plaintiffs' properties could be con
demned. The Norwood code provided
an extensive list of conditions that
would support a finding that an area
was "deteriorated," including: incom

2. See, e.g., Gerijo, Inc. v.
Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638
N.E.2d 533 (1994)(holding that a
party who attacks municipal zon
ing ordinance on constitutional
grounds must prove, beyond fair
debate, bolh that enactment

deprives him or her of economi
cally viable use and that it fails to
advance legitimate governmental
interest.)

3. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by
Ung le v. Chevron U.SA, Inc., 125
S.Ct. 207 4 (2005).
4. 471 Mich. 445, 684 N.W.2d
765 (2004)(overnuling Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit,
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455.)
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The Norwood decision is, however, not the last word on eminent
domain in Ohio.

patible or nonconforming land uses,
lack of adequate parking facilities,
faulty street arrangement, obsolete
platting, and diversity of ownership.
The court expressed skepticism about
these factors, noting that they "exist in
virtually every urban American neigh
borhood," Id. at 25, and thus were sus
pect. The court also noted that some of
the factors listed in the definition
such as "diversity of ownership"-were
themselves not defined in the
Norwood code and thus would be sus
ceptible to different meanings.
Applying heightened scrutiny to the
definition of "deteriorating area" as the
standard for a condemnation in the
Norwood code, the court found it void
for vagueness "because it fails to afford
a property owner fair notice and invites
subjective interpretation." Further, the
court held "that the term 'deteriorating
area' cannot be used as a standard for a
taking, because it inherently incorpo
rates speculation as to the future condi
tion of the property into the decision
on whether a taking is proper rather
than focusing that inquiry on the prop
erty's condition at the time of the pro
posed taking." Id. at 26.
While the court's skepticism about
the vagueness of these terms is not mis
placed, the implications of a ban on tar
geting a "deteriorated area" for redevel
opment by eminent domain are
distressing. Cities in declining urban
areas will not be well served by having
to wait for an area to finish "deteriorat
ing" and arrive at "blighted" or slum sta
tus before intervening through a well
planned economic development project.
This part of the court's opinion calls out
for a response from the planning com
munity. A worthwhile research project
would be an effort to document objec
tive measurements that would allow
planners to predict with a high degree of
confidence that a "deteriorating area"

that falls below a set of thresholds for
well-defined factors (e.g., absentee own
ership, abandoned/vacant property,
unemployment, residents 20 percent or
more below the poverty level, etc.) will,
without public sector intervention, inex
orably decline into blight. This should
address the Ohio-or any other--court's
vagueness concerns and allow a city to
take preventive measures to salvage a
neighborhood sooner rather than later.
Finally, the court also held that
statute ORC § 163.19, which had
allowed the city to obtain and transfer
titles to condemned properties when
it deposited with the court the full
amount of the compensation awards,
was unconstitutional because it vio
lated the separation of powers princi
ple. The court emphasized that once a
condemnation case enters a court's
jurisdiction, it has the inherent
authority to take any lawful action
regarding the subject matter of the lit
igation, including the issuance of a
stay or injunction. This inherent.
authority regarding matters over
which it has jurisdiction is exclusively
within the constitutional realm of the
courts and it is beyond the power of
the legislature to limit that constitu
tional authority. The importance of
this last procedural holding cannot be
overemphasized. Developers under
stand that time is money and are far
less likely to request that a city use its
eminent domain power if acquisition
can be stayed or enjoined pending the
exhaustion of one or more appeals.
The Norwood decision is, however,
not the last word on eminent domain
in Ohio. Just five days after the
court's ruling, a state legislative task
force on eminent domain, formed in
reaction to Keio, issued its final report.
While the report affirms Norwood's
ban on using eminent domain solely
for economic gain, it proposes that
5. The 15 states are Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho.
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vennont, West

Virginia, and Wisconsin. In addi
tion, Pennsylvania legislation (H.B.
1835, H.B. 1836, 189th Gen.
Assam., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005)) is
awaiting the governor's action;
New Hampshire has placed an

government should still be allowed to
use eminent domain to eradicate
blight. The report calls for a state con
stitutional amendment to establish a
uniform definition of blight statewide
and allow cities to use eminent
domain so long as a bare majority of
the properties in a given area meet
that definition.
WHY SUCH A REACTION TO KELO?

Ohio is unique, to date, in having had
both a legislative and state supreme
court response to Keio. But the vast
majority of states-more than 40 as of
early summer 2006-were considering
legislation in reaction to the Keio rul
ing, and 15 had already enacted such
legislation. 5
•
•
The intensity and extent of the neg
ative reaction to the Keio ruling has
been almost unprecedented. Why is
this? Three factors stand out: first, the
uncharacteristically shrill and alarmist
tone of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
dissent; second, the change in the legal
and political climate in the United
States since the Court's last ruling on
eminent domain, the 1984 case of
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984) and third, the media's
and public's outcry against the ruling. 6
The mere fact that Justice
O'Connor dissented in Keio was a sur
prise-but the tone of her dissenting
opinion was a shock. Long seen as a
moderate occupying a centrist position
on the Court, in Keio, Justice O'Connor
not only voted with the more conserva
tive members of the Court but
authored a dissent that rivaled any by
the Court's most conservative Justice,
Antonin Scalia. Despite Justice
Stevens's carefully argued majority
opinion stressing the factors a court
must examine to determine whether
the use of eminent domain for eco
nomic development is truly serving a

eminent domain constitutional
amendment on the November
2006 ballot (Con. Res. 30, 2006
Leg., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2006));
and a New Mexico act was
vetoed by the governor (H.B. 746,
47th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2006)).
6. For example, American
Ccnservative Union (ACU)
Chainnan David Keene stated:

"It is outrageous to think that the
government can take away your
home any time It wants to build a
shopping mall. The Keio ruling is
a slap in the face to property
owners everywhere." ACU Press
Release, Judicial ActMsm Strikes
Again (June 23, 2005), available
at www.conservative.org/press
room/06232005_un.asp.
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Although it is uncertain whether the media outcry heightened
public opposition to the Keio ruling, only one other Supreme
Court case has sparked a similarly extreme reaction: Roe v. Wade,
the 1973 decision upholding a woman's right to an abortion.
legitimate public purpose (rather than
improperly promoting a purely private
benefit), Justice O'Connor's dissent
insisted that the majority's ruling made
neady all private property "susceptible
to condemnation." 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Hammering the point home, she
declared: "The specter of condemna
tion hangs over all property. Nothing is
to prevent the State fr.om replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home
with a shopping mall, or any farm with
a factory." Id. at 2676
Justice O'Connor's inflamed rheto
ric was immediately picked up and
widely disseminated by advocates of
the so-called "property rights move
ment," which was still in its infancy
when Midkiff was decided in 1984. 7
The media also appeared to have
been strongly influenced by Justice
O'Connor's rhetoric, perhaps because
capitalizing on the hyperbole of
"replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz
Carlton" proved irresistible when
compared with the parsed tone of
Justice Stevens's opinion. A forthcom
ing law review article that surveys the
print and electronic media coverage
of the Keio decision concludes that
the overwhelming majority of news
stories and editorials have been criti
cal of the ruling. 8
Although it is uncertain whether the
media outcry heightened-or simply
reflected-public opposition to the
Keio ruling, it is clear that in the past
half-century, only one other Supreme
Court case has sparked a similarly
extreme reaction: Roe v. Wade, the 1973
decision upholding a woman's right to
an abortion. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) At
first, it seems implausible that the
7. The movement's intellectual
"father." University of Chicago law
professor Richard Epstein. would
not publish his conservative cri
tique of takings and eminent
domain until the following year
(RICHARD EPsTBN, TAKJNGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY ANO THE PONER OF

EMINENT DoMAJN, Harvard University

Press. 1985); the Federalist
Society had been formed by a
group of law students only two
years before; and the Institute of
Justice (IJ). which represented
Susette Keio, was not founded
until 1991. The IJ's press release
in response to the Keio rullng

power of eminent domain could rank
with abortion as a hot-button issue for
the American public, but one critical
factor links the two decisions: Each
was seen as allowing government to
"violate" a "right" that many viewed as
inviolable. Thus, while the rulings dif
fered doctrinally-Roe deciding that
the federal Constitution limited state
government authority (over Jane Roe's
"right" to make decisions about her
body) and Keio deciding that the fed
eral Constitution did not limit state
government authority (over Susette
Kelo's "right" to make decisions about
her home)-both decisions deeply
offended a large portion of the country
because each "legalized" an action
viewed by many as immoral: destroy
ing a life in Roe and destroying a home
in Keio.
A critical difference between the
two decisions, however, was their
effect on existing law. Roe was truly a
landmark case: For the first time, the
Supreme Court found a "right to pri
vacy" guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the federal Constitution.
Keio, in contrast, merely followed the
Court's precedents in ruling that the
power of eminent domain could be
used for a public purpose (such as eco
nomic development), as well as for a
public use. 9 Moreover, the Keio major
ity made it clear that states were free
to impose greater limits on the power
of eminent domain than those required
by the federal Constitution. 10 In fact,
starting long before Keio was decided, a
number of states had already inter
preted their state constitutions as
either barring or significantly limiting
condemnation for economic develop
ment purposes. 11

noted that "One of the key quotes
from the Court to keep in mind
today was written by Justice
O'Connor•... who wrote. 'Af'rf
property may now be taken for the
benefit of another private party.
but the fallout from this decision
will not be random. The beneficiar·
ies are likely to be those citizeris
with disproportionate influence
and power in the political process.
including large corporations and
development firms.'" IJ Press

Release, Homeowners Lose
Eminent Domain Gase (June 23,
2005) www.ij.org/private_prop
erty/connecticut/6_23_05pr.html.

8. Daniel H. Cole. Why Keio Is Not
Good News for Local Planners
and Developers, GA. ST. u. L REV.
(forthcoming 2006). A draft is
available at http://indylaw.indi
ana.edu/instructors/cole/cole.htm.
9. See. e.g.. Benman v. Parker.
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
10. "We emphasize that nothing in
our op1nkin precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on
rts exercise of the taikngs pcwer.
lrdeed, many States already impcse
'public use' requirements that are
stricter than the federal baseline."
125 s. Ct. 2655. 2677 (2005).

Given that Keio really did not
change the state of the law, what
arguably accounts for the virulence of
the reaction to it is the combined effect
of the other two factors: Justice
O'Connor's inflammatory rhetoric, and
a well-organized and well-financed
property rights movement eager to fan
those flames.
The Legislative Reaction: Congress

Both Congress and the majority of state
legislatures reacted to Keio by introduc
ing, and in some instances enacting,
laws ranging from authorizing a legisla
tive study of the eminent domain ques
tions raised by Keio, through tinkering
with condemnation procedures, to
severe restrictions on its use. 12 While a
number of bills were introduced in the
U.S. House and Senate, the major
"Keio bill" in Congress is H.R. 4128,
introduced by James Sensenbrenner
(R-Wis.), which passed the House in
November 2005 by a vote of 376--38
but has since been languishing in the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Private
Property Rights Protection Act of 2005,
H.R. 4128, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2005). That bill seeks to prevent the
use of eminent domain for economic
development by denying federal eco
nomic development funds to any state
or local government that uses eminent
domain to transfer private property to
other private parties for economic
development purposes. The proposed
funding ban is for two years following a
judicial determination that the law has
been violated, and the bill allows for
private rights of action to enforce the
law. Id.
Another far more limited measure
addressing economic development has

11. Cole. supra note 8. identifies
the following states. with the date
of the ruling in parentheses: Maine
(1957); Arkansas (1967); South
Carolina (1978); Kentucky (1979);
Washington (1981); New
Hampshire (1985); Illinois (2002);
and Michigan (2004).
12. The Ohio law. Amended
Substitute S.B. 167. 126th Gen.
Assem. (Ohio 2005). imposes a
moratorium until the end of 2006
on the use of eminent domain for
economic development purposes
that would ultimately result in the
property being transferred to
another private party in an area

that is not blighted, and it creates
a task force to study eminent
domain issues. Delaware's law,
S.B. 217 wrth H. Amendment 1,
143 Gen. Assem. (Del. 2005).
would limit the use of eminent
domain to a "stated public pur
pcse" or a "recognized public
use.n The law in Texas, S.B. 7,
79th Leg .• 2d Sess. (Tex. 2005).
prohibits the use of eminent
domain to confer a private benefit
on a private party or for economic
development purpcses (but con
tains certain exemptions).
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More recently, on June 23, 2006, President George W. Bush
issued an Executive Order limiting the use of eminent domain
by federal agencies.

already been enacted by Congress.
(Transportation, Treasury, Housing and
Urban Development, the Judiciary, the
District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat.
2396 (2005)). Sen. Kit Bond (R-Mo.)
successfully attached an amendment to
a federal appropriations bill that pro
hibits use of funds appropriated under
the act for "economic development
that primarily benefits private entities,"
and requires the General Accounting
Office (GAO) to submit to Congress,
within one year, a study "on the nation
wide use of eminent domain." Id. Since
the funding prohibition does little more
than echo existing law-Keio prohibits
eminent domain that "primarily bene
fits private entities"-the effect of the
so-called Bond Amendment remains to
be seen; namely, in the findings the
GAO will report from its study. The
passage of the Bond Amendment has
taken the wind out of the sails for those
pushing to enact H.R. 4128, as it
appears the Senate is content to await
the forthcoming GAO study before tak
ing any further action.
More recently, on June 23, 2006,
President George W. Bush issued an
Executive Order limiting the use of
eminent domain by federal agencies. 13
The Order, titled "Protecting the
Property Rights of the American
People," limits "the taking of private
property by the Federal Government to
situations in which the taking is for
public use, with just compensation, and
for the purpose of benefiting the gen
eral public and not merely for the pur
pose of advancing the economic inter
est of private parties to be given
ownership or use of the property

taken." Given the Keio Court's broad
definition of "public use" and its recog
nition that a condemnation "merely" to
benefit private parties would not meet
even that broad definition, this
Executive Order appears to do nothing
more than restate the Court's ruling in
terms that sound as though they are
protecting property rights, but actually
have no substantive effect.
The most recent "takings" bill, H.R.
4722 (the Private Property Rights
Implementation Act of 2006), passed
by the House in late September, is not
a direct reaction to the Keio ruling since
it deals with regulatory takings rather
than the exercise of eminent domain ..
While a full discussion of that bill is
beyond the scope of this Commentary,
it would allow those claiming that a
state or local regulation has taken their
property to bring that claim in federal
court without first seeking just com
pensation in state court as has been
required since Williamson County v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985),
and would also make it easier for prop
erty owners to claim that rezonings or
dedication/exaction requirements are
unconstitutional takings.
The Legislative Reaction: States

By the summer of 2006, legislation in
response to Keio had been enacted or
introduced in more than 40 states. 14
These legislative proposals and enact
ments can be placed into several dis
tinct categories.
The most radical are those that seek
to "repeal" Keio by effectively banning,
or placing severe limitations on, the use
of eminent domain for economic devel
opment purposes. Legislation in this
category can seek to accomplish that

goal in various ways. Some measures
simply prohibit the use of eminent
domain for "economic development"
using that exact term-while others use
language such as "for the primary pur
poses of creating jobs, generating tax
revenue" or "to transfer private prop
erty to another private use" to identify
the prohibited purpose. Alabama, the
first state to enact legislation in
response to Keio, took this approach in
August 2005 in legislation that pro
hibits the use of condemnation "for the
purpose of nongovernmental retail,
office, commercial, residential, or
industrial development or use ...."
[ALA. CODE§ 18-lB-1 (2005)]. Legis
lation in other states accomplishes the
same goal by limiting eminent domain
to achieving a "public use," and then
defining that term so as to exclude eco
nomic development. Examples are a
bill introduced in South Carolina that
defines "public use" as requiring the
"possession, occupation and enjoyment
of the condemned property by the pub
lic at large or by public agencies" [H.B.
4310, 116th Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2006)]
and in South Dakota, which prohibits
the use of eminent domain either to
transfer condemned property "to any
private person, nongovernmental
entity, or other public-private business
entity; or primarily for enhancement of
tax revenue" [H.B. 1080 (S.D. 2006)].
Before describing other categories
of anti-Keio legislation, the Alabama
law is worth discussing further
because it illustrates a critical point:
the importance of a detailed analysis
of the actual legislative proposal or
enactment. While the Alabama law
seemingly bans condemnation for eco
nomic development, it contains a cru
13. The Presidential Order may be
found at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/release
s/2006/06/20060623-1 O.html

Search hundreds of abstracts
on PEL Online
www.planning.org/pel

14. The APA website tracks emi
nent domain legislation; see
www.planning.org~egislation/emi

nentdomain.
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Another significant category of legislation comprises laws that
either prohibit condemnation of residential property or impose
additional compensation requirements for acquisition of such
property.
cial exception: It does not apply to
the exercise of eminent domain
"based upon a finding of blight in an
area covered by any redevelopment
plan or urban renewal plan." [ALA.
CODE§ 18-lB-1 (2005)). In the view
of one property rights group, this
exception swallows the rule and
effectively allows Alabama cities and
development agencies to take private
property for economic development
because other provisions of state law
define "blight" broadly. 15 An 'Indiana
bill, S.B. 391, has a similar loophole.
It prohibits condemnation for "com
mercial use," but exempts property
that is blighted, or cases where "it is
likely that the property will promote
employment or create business oppor
tunities." [S.B. 391, l 14th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006)).
In other states, legislation that con
tains a "blight exception" to a general
ban on condemnation for economic
development--or limits condemnation
to blighted property-is more restrictive.
Texas, for example, enacted a ban on
condemnation for economic develop
ment with a "blight exemption" in
September 2005, just a month after
Alabama, but the Texas law adopted a
far more restrictive definition of blight,
requiring that the condemnation seek to
"eliminate an existing affirmative harm
on society from slum or blight areas."
[TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.§ 2206.001(b)(3)
(2005).) The critical term here is "affir
mative harm," which refers to a distinc
tion that Justice O'Connor emphasized
in her Keio dissent. She noted that the
Supreme Court's prior approvals of emi
nent domain had all involved uses that
"inflicted affirmative harm on society";
thus, she reasoned, the only permissible
use of eminent domain for a "public
purpose" is to address a police power
violation or a public nuisance-a far
more constricted scope for eminent

domain than the majority's view that the
condemnation power is coextensive with
the police power. Keio, 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2674 (2005) (O'Connor,]., dissenting).
Other examples of legislation that
places greater limits than those of Keio
on a government's ability to use emi
nent domain to address blight include
measures in Arizona, which limits con
demnation to "slum" property and
requires that the determination be
made on a property-by-property, not
areawide, basis, and imposes a two
thirds supermajority requirement on
the legislative body making the deter
mination, H.B. 2675, 47th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (vetoed by the
governor on June 6, 2006); Oklahoma,
which redefines "blighted area" as a
place where the presence of a majority
· of listed factors substantially impairs
the sound development and growth of
the area as a menace to the public
health, safety, morals, or welfare of the
area, and redefines a "blighted prop
erty" to be a structure that endangers
life or property due to its unsafe condi
tions [S.B. 1066, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2006)); and Illinois, limiting
condemnation to a "blighted area," and
further requiring that prior to the con
demnation, the condemning govern
mental entity enter into an agreement
with a private entity to undertake the
proposed redevelopment project [S.B.
3086, 94th Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2006); (sent to the governor on June 1,
2006)).
Another significant category of leg
islation comprises laws that either
prohibit condemnation of residential
property or impose additional com
pensation requirements for acquisi
tion of such property. Some of these
limit the protection to primary resi
dences or to acquisition for particular
purposes. Legislation calling for addi
tional compensation takes two basic

forms: requiring compensation to
exceed fair market value (FMV), as
with Indiana's H.B. 1010, which was
signed by Gov. Mitch Daniels on
March 24, 2006, requiring 150 percent
of FMV for acquisition of a primary
residence, [H.B. 1010, 114th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006)) or
allowing for the reimbursement of
costs not normally covered, such as
S.B. 2746 in Illinois, which permits
the reimbursement of condemnees'
appraisal costs, legal fees, and reloca
tion expenses. [S.B. 2746, 94th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006)) Illinois
is not unique in considering the com
pensation issue more broadly than the
residential context; several other
states are pondering whether just
compensation should include com
pensation to displaced renters and
business lessees. 16
Moreover, a number of proposals
seek to restrain abuses of eminent
domain by enhancing procedural pro
tections. Many of these involve the
imposition of a two-thirds or three
fourths supermajority voting require
ment on legislative approvals of con
demnations, or enhanced notice to
intended condemnees of imminent
governmental action. Delaware
enacted such legislation in July 2005,
requiring six months' notice prior to
initiating condemnation procedures, a
public hearing prior to condemnation,
and the publication of a report describ
ing the purpose for the exercise of emi
nent domain; the law also requires that
the government pay attorneys fees for
parties in condemnation proceedings.
[DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 29, §§ 9503 &
9505 (2005)).
Another category of state legislation
addressing perceived abuse of eminent
domain comprises measures allowing a
former owner to reacquire condemned
property if the purpose for which it was

15. Timothy Sandefur, The
"Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens
Get Meaningful Eminent Domain
Reform? A.L.1.· A.BA Continuing
Legal Education, January 5-7,
2006; SL049 ALl·ABA 703
(Westlaw). Working Paper No. 05·
105 (2005), p. 20.
16. See, e.g., FL ST. § 73.071
{allowing business owners, includ

ing lessees, to make c;:laims for

"business damages") and A.8.
9050 (NY 2005·05 Regular
Session) (compensating tenants
who have resided at the property
for six months or more).
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Despite the concerted efforts of property rights advocates, it
appears that more moderate voices are now beginning to be
heard.

acquired under eminent domain does
not come to fruition. Some proposals
provide a right to repurchase if the
condemned property is not used for
the stated public purpose or for a pub
lic use within a specified period of ·
time (10 years after condemnation, for
example, in South Carolina) [H.B.
4292, 116th Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2006)];
others either require the government
to offer the property back to the origi
nal owner (for example, in Oklahoma,
at the lower of FMV or the price that
was originally paid) [S.B.1035, 50th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2006)] or to
allow the former owner to petition the
government for the property's return if
it is not used for a public purpose.
Some of the state laws and propos
als postpone any substantive reaction
to Keio until completion of a study, the
approach adopted in the Bond
Amendment. 17 For example, Ohio S.B.
167, signed into law by Gov. Bob Taft
in November 2005, created a
"Legislative Task Force to Study
Eminent Domain" that was to report
back to the Legislature by August 1,
2006-which, as noted previously, it
has-and imposed a moratorium on
eminent domain for economic develop
ment until December 31, 2006. This
law is another example that shows "the
devil is in the details" for these various
proposals, as the moratorium applies
only to condemnation of land for eco
nomic development purposes if the
land is not blighted and the condemna
tion was "initiated on or after the
effective date" of the act. [Amended
Substitute S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem.
(Ohio 2005)] In New Mexico, Gov. Bill
Richardson created a similar study task
force in June after vetoing legislation
that would have barred condemnation
for economic development, 18 and
Indiana and Tennessee are considering
proposals authorizing similar studies. 19

Finally, and of greatest concern to
planners and local officials, were the
efforts by "property rights" advocates
in a number of western states to capi
talize on the public's distaste for the
Keio ruling by placing on the ballot
measures that couple restrictions on
eminent domain with compensation
mandates for regulations that lower
property values, the latter modeled on
Oregon's notorious Measure 37. 20
Ballot measures to limit both eminent
domain and regulatory powers were
initially scheduled to appear in six
western states 21 this November, but
court rulings removed them from the
ballot in Montana (citing fraud in
obtaining the petitions) and Nevada
(ordering the removal of sections on
regulatory takings because two sepa
rate issues cannot be combined in a
single ballot measure). Washington's
Initiative 933 and California's
Proposition 90 exemplifed the meas
ures that remained on the ballot. The
Washington Initiative most closely
resembled Measure 37. It would
require government either to exempt
property owners from regulations
approved after 1995 that diminished
their property values or compensate
them for the diminution. The
California Proposition focused almost
entirely on eminent domain, but had
one small subsection that required
government to compensate property
owners for "damage" to their property
when "government action" results in
"substantial economic loss."
WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Despite the concerted efforts of prop
erty rights advocates, it appears that
more moderate voices are now begin
ning to be heard. In contrast to the ver
itable flood of invective against Keio
immediately following the decision, we
are now hearing and seeing a different

17. Transportation, Treasury, Hous
ing and Urban Development, the
Judiciary, the District of Columbia,
and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat.
2396 (2005).
18. The bill is H.B. 746, 47th Leg.,
2d Sess. (N.M. 2006). Barry

Massey, Governor Vetoes Eminent
Domain Legislation, FREE NEW

MEXICAN, Mar. 8, 2006, WWW.
freenewmexlcan.com/news/40445.
html.

19. H.B. 2428/S.B.2424 (Tenn.
2006) (would create a special joint
committee to study the exercise of
eminent domain in this state and
report rrs findings to the 105th
General Assembly by February 1,
2007); the Indiana Legislative
Council's Interim Study Committee

message. Congress and several states
have chosen to study the issue of emi
nent domain, rather than rush an ill
considered "quick fix" into law. The
media has begun to feature stories that
question the call of Keio opponents for
a ban on the use of eminent domain for
economic development. In the last few
months, for example, stories have
appeared in the New York Times and
other major newspapers stressing how
difficult it might be to move forward
with major real estate developments if
eminent domain is not an available
tool. 22
In addition, as eminent domain
proposals slowly move through the
legislative process and we get further
away from the initial uproar against
Keio, we should expect that other
interest groups that have been rela
tively quiet will start to assert their
views to lawmakers. Such groups are
not limited to real estate developers
and advocates for local government.
Groups concerned with protecting
lower income and minority neighbor
hoods, for example, are beginning to
recognize that the "blight exceptions"
in many legislative proposals will
make their constituencies even more
vulnerable than before Keio. The
mobilization of "pro-Keio" interests,
combined with the "let's study the
problem" approach in Congress and a
growing number of states, suggests
that much of the legislation that
finally emerges in response to Keio
may be more nuanced and less dra
conian than originally feared. Indeed,
some of the legislation will be a
much-needed improvement on the
status quo. There are few reasons, if
any, to argue against enhanced proce
dural protections for condemnees so
long as these do not impose unneces
sary delays. The same is true for pro
posals that seek to ensure compensa

on Eminent Domain issued its Final
Report in November, 2005 (avail
able at www.in.gov~egislative/
interim/ccmmittee/2005/commrr
teesficed.htm~.

20. For a description and evaluation
of Measure 37, see Edward J.
Sullivan, Year Zero: The Aftermath
of Measure 37, 38 uRB. LAW. 237
(2006); and wrrh Carrie A. Richter, A

Taste of Ashes-The MacPherson

Decision and the Future of Oregon's
Planning Program' 58 PLANNING &
ENVTL. LAW 4 (2006).

21. Arzona, California, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, and Washington.
22. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent
Good Sense, N.Y. TIMES, April g,
2006, Section 14LI, Page 17; Terry
Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine a

World Without Eminent Domain,
N.Y. TIMES, January 18, 2006.
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In states that shackle government regulatory powers with Measure 37
like legislation, voters will soon learn whether exemptions from land
use regulation-or payment of compensation-to property owners
who claim harm is a viable public policy.

Search the iudicial
decisions and legislation
of 2006
only at

PEL Online
This December, look for
the annual Planning &

Environmental Law index
online, not in your mailbox.
You'll find the complete
index of all the cases
abstracted in 2006,
plus a review of the year's
pertinent legislation,
at PEL Online.

www.planning.org/pel

American Planning Association
Making Great CommnnitieH Happett

tion for the full range of costs borne
by those whose property is con
demned; to provide assistance for
renters, business tenants, and others
who are displaced by eminent domain
but who themselves are not property
owners; or that permit a former owner
to reacquire property condemned for
a project that never comes to fruition.
No doubt some states will choose a
more extreme route and enact laws that
effectively limit eminent domain to the
most "traditional" public uses: roads,
public utility facilities, airports, and the
like. By the time you read this, voters
in other states may have already
approved November ballot measures
that impose compensation/exception
requirements on government regula
tion. But even those outcomes may
prove to be a blessing in disguise. It
will allow the public, over time, to com
pare outcomes such as inner city revital
ization in those states whose response
to Keio is well-considered reform with
those that enact the most severe restric
tions on the availability of eminent
domain. Similarly, in states that shackle
government regulatory powers with
Measure 37-like legislation, voters will
soon learn whether exemptions from
land use regulation-or payment of
compensation-to property owners who
claim harm is a viable public policy. In
short, by giving a green light to states to
experiment with different approaches
to reforming eminent domain (and in
some instances even regulatory taking
principles)--an approach famously
dubbed "the laboratory of the states"
by Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis 23-the legislative and judicial
reactions to Keio may provide us with
data we now lack about how to make
eminent domain a more effective tool
for economic development while curb
ing the shortcomings that have eroded
public support for its use.
23. ''To stay experimentation
in things social and eco
nomic ls a grave responsibil
ity. Denial of the right to
experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences
to the Nation. It is one of the
happy incidents of the fed
eral system that a single
courageous State may. if its

citizens choose, serve as a

laboratory; and try novel
social and economic exper
iments without risk to the
rest of the country." New
State Ice Co. v. Uebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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